In the 'modernist' image of the nation it is nationalism that creates national identity. Gellner puts the matter succinctly when he declares: 'Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist — but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative . . .’” In the same vein Kedourie argues that nationalism itself is an 'invented doctrine': 'Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.’2 How shall we understand such 'invention'? In what sense does nationalism invent or create nations 'where they do not exist'?

We have already seen, in chapter 2, that we need to probe the configuration of ethnic ties and sentiments if we want to ascertain which units might emerge as nations (if and when they did so). Generally speaking, the stronger and more persistent the pre-existing ethnic identity, the more likely was any nation that might emerge to be based on that identity. In discussing the processes and routes of the formation of nations in chapter 3 it became equally clear that pre-modern ethnic identities formed the base-line in attempting to explain why and how nations emerged, at least in Europe.

I shall argue that the same is true of nationalism. Nationalism does, indeed, help to create nations, many of them apparently or in aspiration ‘new’. As an ideology and a language nationalism is relatively modern, emerging into the political arena over a period in the late eighteenth century. But nations and nationalism are no more 'invented' than other kinds of culture, social organization or ideology. If nationalism is part of the 'spirit of the age', it is equally dependent upon earlier motifs, visions and ideals. For what we call nationalism operates on many levels and may be regarded as a form of culture as much as a species of political ideology and social movement. And, while a new era opens with the arrival of nationalism, it is impossible to grasp its impact on the formation of national identity without exploring its social and cultural matrix,
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

which already owed so much to the presence of pre-modern *ethnies* and the gradual emergence of national states in the West. Hence the need to explore nationalism first as a form of culture and identity before going on to look at its political impact in the next chapter. Hence the need also to ask the question 'When and where did nations emerge?' in the context both of the impact of nationalism and its proponents and of the processes by which nations were formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties, processes discussed in the last two chapters.

NATIONALISM: IDEOLOGY, LANGUAGE, SENTIMENT

The term nationalism has been used in several ways. It can signify:

1. the whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states
2. a consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity
3. a language and symbolism of the 'nation' and its role
4. an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the national will
5. a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will.

We may, I think, dismiss the first usage from our consideration. It is much broader than the others, and it has already been discussed.

The second usage, that of national consciousness or sentiment, must be distinguished from the others. It is quite possible to find a population exhibiting a high degree of national consciousness without having much in the way of an ideology or doctrine of the nation, let alone a nationalist movement. England affords a good example of this, though even here nationalist ideologies have made their appearance from time to time, as in the period of Cromwell and Milton or at the time of Burke and Blake.

Conversely, we find nationalist movements and ideologies among populations with little or no national consciousness or sentiment. They may emerge among a small segment of the population but find no echo in the population at large. This was the case in much of West Africa, including the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Quite apart
from ethnic and regional divisions, the novelty of these colonies meant that most of the inhabitants of these newly formed British colonies were unaware of a Gold Coast, later Ghanaian, or Nigerian nationality to which they were supposed to belong. Similarly, among Arabs and Pakistanis the vast majority saw themselves as Muslims rather than Arabs or Pakistanis, despite the vociferous campaigns of the small group of nationalists among them.3

The same could also be said about nationalism as a language and symbolism. As we shall see, this too begins as an elite phenomenon in which intellectuals play a preponderant role. It is not, however, the same as either nationalist ideology or national sentiment. A nationalist language and symbolism is broader than an ideology or ideological movement; it often connects that ideology with the 'mass sentiments' of wider segments of the designated population, notably through slogans, ideas, symbols and ceremonies. At the same time nationalist language and symbolism span both the cognitive and expressive dimensions, linking up with broader aspirations and feelings among both élites and wider strata. Notions of autonomy and authenticity and symbols of self-reliance and of natural community (for example, re-enactments of resistance events, or symbols of landscape and historical monuments or of local products, crafts or sports) exemplify the fusion of cognitive and expressive aspects and the links with wider sentiments and aspirations. The feeling for authenticity to be found among the exponents of the Gaelic Revival in late nineteenth-century Ireland, with its stress on native sports, nature, local crafts and ancient pagan heroes, illustrates the diffusion of the new language and symbolism of Irish nationalism.4

Finally, the last usage, that of nationalist movement, is closely linked with nationalist ideology. It is, in fact, inconceivable without it. Hence, I shall run the two together and, while recognizing that one can find and discuss nationalist ideology in the absence of a nationalist movement, I shall define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.5 In fact, this definition embodies elements from both the ideology and the language-cum-symbolism of the nation, with references to wider sentiments and aspirations.
Let me start with the ideology of nationalism. We may define the central propositions of the ideology, or 'core doctrine', as follows,

1. The world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality, history and destiny.
2. The nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances.
3. Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and realize themselves.
4. Nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world.

I have deliberately avoided all mention of the state in this formulation of nationalism's 'core doctrine'. In a sense, such reference is implicit in propositions 2 and 4. But nationalism is an ideology of the nation, not the state. It places the nation at the centre of its concerns, and its description of the world and its prescriptions for collective action are concerned only with the nation and its members. The idea that nations can be free only if they possess their own sovereign state is neither necessary nor universal. Early nationalists, as well as cultural nationalists thereafter (such as Rousseau, Herder, Achad Ha'am, Aurobindo), were not particularly interested in the acquisition of a state, either in general or for the nation with whose aspirations they identified. Nor has every nationalist movement made the acquisition of a state for its nation a priority. Many Catalan, Scots and Flemish nationalists have been more concerned with home rule and cultural parity in a multinational state than with outright independence (though there are some nationalists who want outright independence in all these cases). The notion that every nation must have its own state is a common, but not a necessary, deduction from the core doctrine of nationalism; and it tells us that nationalism is primarily a cultural doctrine or, more accurately, a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre.

This cultural doctrine depends, in turn, on the introduction of new concepts, languages and symbols. Nationalism, I have argued, is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of a nation. Each of these concepts derives from the new philosophical, historical and anthropological languages or discourses that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

ics in Europe. There is, for example, a straightforward understanding of the concept of 'identity' as 'sameness'. The members of a particular group are alike in just those respects in which they differ from non-members outside the group. Members dress and eat in similar ways and speak the same language; in all these respects they differ from non-members, who dress, eat and speak in different ways. This pattern of similarity-cum-dissimilarity is one meaning of national 'identity'.

But there is also a philosophical and anthropological concept that was developed in the eighteenth century. It stems from the idea of 'national genius' found in the writings of Lord Shaftesbury, among others; he speaks, for example, of the 'rising Genius of our Nation' (Britain) and prophesies that it will become the 'principal seat of the Arts'. The idea of national identity or, more often, national character is common to eighteenth-century writers, notably Montesquieu and Rousseau. The latter, indeed, declared: 'The first rule which we have to follow is that of national character: every people has, or must have, a character; if it lacks one, we must start by endowing it with one.'

Herder made this principle into a cornerstone of his cultural populism. For Herder every nation has its peculiar 'genius', its own ways of thinking, acting and communicating, and we must work to rediscover that unique genius and that peculiar identity, wherever it is submerged or lost: 'Let us follow our own path ... let all men speak well or ill of our nation, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough.' Hence the importance of rediscovering the 'collective self through philology, history and archaeology, of tracing one's roots in an 'ethnic past', in order to ascertain the authentic identity beneath the alien accretions of the centuries.

The concept of unity also has a plain and a more esoteric nationalist meaning. At the simplest level it refers to unification of the national territory or homeland, if it is divided, and the gathering together within the homeland of all nationals. Even here nationalists introduced a more philosophical idea: nationals outside the homeland were deemed to be 'lost', and the lands they inhabited, especially those contiguous to the homeland, were 'unredeemed' (irredenta) and had to be recovered and 'redeemed'. This sometimes
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

produced nationalist movements of irredentism, such as the later Italian, Greek and pan-German movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Such movements are still in evidence: witness the Argentinian claim to the Malvinas or Falklands, the Somali claim to the Ogaden and the IRA claims to Ulster. 12

But there is a further meaning to the nationalist ideal of unity. In nationalist language 'unity' signifies social cohesion, the brotherhood of all nationals in the nation, what the French patriots called fraternité during the Revolution. The family metaphor underlying the genealogical concept of the nation reappears here in secular, political guise: as the union of fraternal citizens, symbolized in David's celebrated Oath of the Horatii, the three brothers who swore on their father's sword to conquer or die (vaincre ou mourir) for their patria or fatherland. 13

The nationalist ideal of unity has had profound consequences. For one thing, it has encouraged the idea of the indivisibility of the nation (la république une et indivisible) and justified the eradication, often by force, of all intermediate bodies and local differences in the interests of cultural and political homogeneity. This has spawned mass-mobilizing policies of social and political integration in which the state becomes the agent of the 'nation-to-be' and the creator of a 'political community' and 'political culture' that must replace the various ethnic cultures of a heterogeneous population. Here the nationalist concept of unity turns back on its ethnic roots and seeks a uniformity that will transcend cultural differences with the projected nation. 14

Finally, with the concept of autonomy we have entered the Kantian world of 'self-determination'. Not that there was no concept of political freedom before the modern European philosophical tradition: as far back as Josephus, if not Thucydides, we find the appeal to freedom to preserve ancestral ways from foreign interference. 15 But with Kant autonomy becomes an ethical imperative for the individual, a principle of his being, not just a political ideal to be invoked at times of danger. Applied by Fichte, Schlegel and the other German Romantics to groups rather than individuals, the ideal of autonomy gave rise to a philosophy of national self-determination and collective struggle to realize the authentic national will — in a state of one's own. Only then would the community be
able to follow its own 'inner rhythms', heed its own inward voice and return to its pure and uncontaminated pristine state. That is why nationalists must devote so much time and effort to instilling a genuinely national will, so that the members of the nation will be truly free of alien ideas and ways that are liable to destroy and stunt their development and that of the community as a whole. Nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its members to its true collective 'self, so that it, and they, obey only the 'inner voice' of the purified community. Authentic experience and authentic community are therefore preconditions of full autonomy, just as only autonomy can allow the nation and its members to realize themselves in an authentic manner. Autonomy is the goal of every nationalist. 16

These concepts - autonomy, identity, national genius, authenticity, unity and fraternity — form an interrelated language or discourse that has its expressive ceremonials and symbols. These symbols and ceremonies are so much part of the world we live in that we take them, for the most part, for granted. They include the obvious attributes of nations — flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, passports, frontiers — as well as more hidden aspects, such as national recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town planning, legal procedures, educational practices and military codes - all those distinctive customs, mores, styles and ways of acting and feeling that are shared by the members of a community of historical culture. 17

In many ways national symbols, customs and ceremonies are the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism. They embody its basic concepts, making them visible and distinct for every member, communicating the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the community. Symbols and ceremonies have always possessed the emotive collective qualities described by Durkheim, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of nationalist symbols and ceremonies. Indeed, much of what Durkheim attributes to the totemic rites and symbols of the Arunta and other Australian tribes
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

applies with far greater force to nationalist rites and ceremonies, for nationalism dispenses with any mediating referent, be it totem or deity; its deity is the nation itself. The emotions it unleashes are those of the community directed to itself, self-consciously extolling itself. The virtues it celebrates are exclusively and solely those of the 'national self, and the crimes it condemns are those that threaten to disrupt that self. By means of the ceremonies, customs and symbols every member of a community participates in the life, emotions and virtues of that community and, through them, re-dedicates him- or herself to its destiny. By articulating and making tangible the ideology of nationalism and the concepts of the nation ceremonial and symbolism help to assure the continuity of an abstract community of history and destiny.  

What are the underlying sentiments and aspirations that nationalist ideology and nationalist language and symbols evoke? They relate to three main referents: territory, history and community. In the last chapter we saw how, particularly in demotic ethnies engaged in 'vernacular mobilization', intelligentsias sought to construct cognitive maps of a world of nations and to inculcate expressive moralities for collective emulation. To these ends they employed two main strategies: the use of landscape or poetic spaces and the use of history or golden ages. In fact, these strategies were rooted in popular attitudes to space and time and to popular attachments to home and fathers. It was these ancient beliefs and commitments to ancestral homelands and to the generations of one's forefathers that nationalists made use of in elaborating the new ideology, language and symbolism of a complex abstraction, national identity. The new concept of the nation was made to serve as a time—space framework to order chaos and render the universe meaningful by harnessing pre-modern mass aspirations and sentiments for local and familial attachments; herein lay a vital part of the wide appeal of an otherwise abstruse ideology and language.

But perhaps the most fundamental sentiments evoked by nationalism were, paradoxically, those of family — paradoxically because real families can constitute an obstacle to the ideal of a homogeneous nation wherever nationalism embraces the ideal in that extreme form. That too was part of David's message in the Oath of the Horattis, mentioned earlier; the women on the right of the picture
grieve for the loss of their loved ones and the imminent destruction of their family ties. At the same time the metaphor of family is indispensable to nationalism. The nation is depicted as one great family, the members as brothers and sisters of the motherland or fatherland, speaking their mother tongue. In this way the family of the nation overrides and replaces the individual's family but evokes similarly strong loyalties and vivid attachments. Even where local allegiances are tolerated and real families given their due the language and symbolism of the nation asserts its priority and, through the state and citizenship, exerts its legal and bureaucratic pressures on the family, using similar kinship metaphors to justify itself. 20

TYPES OF NATIONALISM

So far I have considered nationalism as an undifferentiated whole in terms of its ideology and core doctrine, its language and symbolism and its sentiments and aspirations. When we move on to consider nationalist movements, however, we come up against clear differences in their goals, differences that reach back into the underlying conceptual divergence between the civic—territorial model and the ethnic—genealogical model of the nation, described in chapter i.

This difference is so profound, and the kinds of nationalism to which these alternative models give rise are so varied, that some have despaired of finding any unitary concept of nationalism. Chameleon-like, nationalism takes its colour from its context. Capable of endless manipulation, this eminently malleable nexus of beliefs, sentiments and symbols can be understood only in each specific instance; nationalism-in-general is merely a lazy historian's escape from the arduous task of explaining the influence of this or that particular nationalist idea, argument or sentiment in its highly specific context. Though few would perhaps go as far as this claim implies, several historians would agree with the basic 'contextualist' argument and regard the differences between specific nationalisms as in many ways more important than any surface similarities. 21

There are several difficulties with this argument. Nobody would deny the importance of social and cultural context in the rise, formulation and course of a particular instance of nationalism. But to describe it as an instance of nationalism presupposes some idea of
a general family to which such instances belong or which they exemplify, albeit mixed with other elements. It is difficult to avoid recourse to a general concept of the nation and nationalism — even when we agree on the importance and uniqueness of each instance, a claim that nationalists, ironically, would gladly support.

Second, to deny the legitimacy of a concept of nationalism-in-general would prevent us from posing general sociological questions about the modernity of nations and the ubiquity of nationalism's appeal today and from making historical comparisons between different nationalist ideologies, symbols and movements. In fact, the same historians who insist on the specific context of each case of nationalism pose such general questions and make these historical comparisons; and this surely is desirable if we are to gain some understanding of so elusive and complex a phenomenon as nationalism.

Third, the 'contextualist' argument bypasses a fundamental task of the study of complex phenomena like nationalism: the provision of typologies of nationalist ideologies and/or movements. Such typologies recognize the importance of broadly differing contexts without sacrificing the possibility of more general comparisons. Arguing that nationalism exhibits a diversity within unity, they go on to pinpoint the main kinds of ideology and movement in terms of historical period, geographical area, level of economic development, philosophical assumptions, class context, cultural milieu or political aspirations. This is the strategy that I propose to follow here.

This is not the place to consider the various typologies that scholars have proposed. I shall mention one or two, and state briefly my own typology as a prelude to an analysis of the cultural matrix and impact of nationalism in Europe. Other typologies are enumerated in other earlier works. 22

Undoubtedly, the most influential typology is that of Hans Kohn. He distinguished a 'Western', rational and associational version of nationalism from an 'Eastern', organic and mystical version. In Britain, France and America, he argued, a rational concept of the nation emerged, one that viewed it as an association of human beings living in a common territory under the same government and laws. This ideology was largely a product of the middle classes,
who came to power in these states at the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast, Eastern Europe (east of the Rhine) had not developed a significant middle class. Instead a few intellectuals led the resistance to Napoleon and the ensuing nationalisms. Because they were numerically insignificant and excluded from power their versions of nationalism were inevitably shrill and authoritarian. For the same reason they saw the nation as a seamless, organic unity with a mystical 'soul' and 'mission' that only the vernacular intellectuals could fathom. Hence their often leading role in nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Asia.23

This typology can be criticized on a number of grounds. Its geopolitical dimension overlooks the influence of both kinds of ideological nationalism in different European communities - the organic version in Ireland and later nineteenth-century France, the rational ideal in some versions of Czech, Hungarian and Zionist nationalism as well as in early West African nationalisms.24

It is also not clear that Western nationalisms are the product of the bourgeoisie. As we have seen, they owe much to earlier monarchical and aristocratic culture and activities. Similarly, the commitment of the bourgeoisie to rational versions of nationalism is a dubious assumption: witness the often mystical pan-German sentiments of the German industrial bourgeoisie or the support for an organic and 'primitivist' Russian nationalism by wealthy Russian merchants at the end of the nineteenth century.25

There is also the distinction drawn by Plamenatz between the culturally far more developed Italian and German nationalisms and the relatively underdeveloped Balkan and Eastern European nationalisms, with their lack of cultural and educational resources, which hampered their chances and produced weaker, but shriller, movements.26

Despite these criticisms, Kohn's philosophical distinction between a more rational and a more organic version of nationalist ideology remains valid and useful. It is implicit in the distinction drawn in chapter I between 'Western' civic-territorial and 'Eastern' ethnic-genealogical models of the nation. Here too we have to treat geopolitical labels cautiously. Both models can be found in the 'East', in the 'West', in Asia, Africa and in Latin America, as well as within many nationalist movements.
Nevertheless, the conceptual distinction has important consequences. Civic and territorial models of the nation tend to produce certain kinds of nationalist movement: 'anti-colonial' movements before independence has been attained and 'integration' movements after independence. Ethnic and genealogical models of the nation, on the other hand, tend to give rise to secessionist or diaspora movements before independence and irredentist or 'pan' movements thereafter. This overlooks a number of sub-varieties, as well as mixed cases; but it captures, I think the basic logic of many nationalisms.

On this basis we can construct a provisional typology of nationalisms around the distinction between ethnic and territorial nationalism, taking into account the overall situation in which particular communities and movements find themselves both before and after independence. These situations, together with the basic orientation, largely determine the political goals of each nationalism. Thus we find the following.

1. Territorial nationalisms
   (a) Pre-independence movements whose concept of the nation is mainly civic and territorial will seek first to eject foreign rulers and substitute a new state-nation for the old colonial territory; these are anti-colonial nationalisms.
   (b) Post-independence movements whose concept of the nation remains basically civic and territorial will seek to bring together and integrate into a new political community often disparate ethnic populations and to create a new 'territorial nation' out of the old colonial state; these are integration nationalisms.

2. Ethnic nationalisms
   (a) Pre-independence movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical will seek to secede from a larger political unit (or secede and gather together in a designated ethnic homeland) and set up a new political 'ethno-nation' in its place; these are secession and diaspora nationalisms.
   (b) Post-independence movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical will seek to expand by including ethnic 'kinsmen' outside the present boundaries
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

of the 'ethno-nation' and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger 'ethno-national' state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states; these are irredentist and 'pan' nationalisms.27

This does not pretend to be an exhaustive typology. It omits several well-known kinds of nationalism, notably protectionist economic and 'integral' fascist nationalisms and racial nationalisms. But it can be argued that the latter constitute sub-varieties of post-independence integration or irredentist nationalisms, with which they are, in fact, historically associated, as in the case of Maurras' 'integral' nationalism in the period of French irredentist nationalism over Alsace-Lorraine, or Latin American protectionism at a time of populist integration nationalisms in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.28

Such a basic typology helps us to compare nationalisms within each category, and to place nationalisms in broad comparable contexts, while allowing the possibility of more general explanations. This is not to gainsay the unique features of particular instances of nationalism. On the contrary: the very fact that it has proved necessary to sketch a 'core doctrine' and the basic concepts and symbols of nationalism suggests the importance of those other features of a particular nationalism that are unique to each case. These specific doctrines and concepts (a better term than 'secondary' or 'additional') play a vital role in each instance and not just a supporting role. For it is the specific doctrines and ideas that provide the symbolism and ceremonial that arouse the deepest popular emotions and aspirations - notably when they are interwoven with much older symbols and ceremonies. The idea of Poland as the 'suffering Christ', a messianic figure of redemption that pervades the poetry of Poland's great poet, Mickiewicz, is allied to the redemptive power of the Madonna of Jasna Gora, still the object of a mass cult of devotion. The ethno-religious Catholic image of suffering and redemption is central to an understanding of the ideology, language and symbolism of Polish nationalism.29 Similarly, the invocation of Hindu heroes and deities, like Shivaji and the goddess Kali, by Tilak and his followers, though remote from the secular ideology of nationalism-in-general, played a vital role in creating a Hindu Indian nationalism that singled out the unique, the
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

incommensurable, elements of a genuinely Indian nation. For without such bonds of differentiation there can be no nation.\textsuperscript{30}

The importance of specific doctrines and symbols of nationalism points towards the deeper meaning of nationalism — the ideology, the language, the consciousness. In a world of nations each nation is unique, each is 'chosen'. Nationalism is the secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern, sacred myth of ethnic election. A doctrine of polycentric uniqueness, it preaches the universality of 'irreplaceable culture values'. Where once each ethnic community was a world unto itself, the centre of the universe, the light amid darkness, now the heritage and culture values from the storehouse of that same community, selected, reinterpreted and reconstituted, form one unique, incommensurable national identity among many other, equally unique, cultural identities. This means that every culture, even the least developed and elaborated, possesses some 'value' that is irreplaceable and may contribute to the total fund of human cultural values. Nationalism, as an ideology and symbolism, legitimates every cultural configuration, summoning intellectuals everywhere to transform 'low' into 'high' cultures, oral into written, literary traditions, in order to preserve for posterity its fund of irreplaceable culture values. Chosen peoples were formerly selected by their deities; today they are chosen by an ideology and a symbolism that elevate the unique and the individual and transform them into a global reality. In former days peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today they are called to be nations because of their cultural heritages.

THE CULTURAL MATRIX OF NATIONALISM

A world of cultural diversity, of many 'chosen cultures', is also a world of ethnic historicism. At first sight such a world appears remote from the world of territorial absolutism that saw the birth of nationalist ideologies, symbolism and movements. Nevertheless, it was in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Western Europe that nationalist ideals, motifs and symbols first appeared. For, while sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe witnessed powerful movements of messianic religious nationalism — notably in Holland and England but also in Bohemia and Poland - the con-